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You study a
self-defense art at least in part because you wonder whether, someday,
sometime, somehow, you might need to use those skills in a real-world
situation. Training in aikido can provide you with some of the tools you could
call upon to protect yourself or others. But what are your legal rights to
defend yourself? Where does your right to defend yourself or others end,
according to the laws of the State of
In the spirit of shodo-o-seisu ("controlling the first
move"), we want to encourage all Still Point participants to find out
more about your legal range of effectiveness before you may have to defend
yourself against a physical attack. A well-rounded self-defense
preparation should include more than just physical defense.
Here's the question we want to
address with you: How does the application of Aikido merge with
Below are some reference resources for your consideration. Please take your
time and browse through these direct quotations from Texas Statutes:
Self-defense
The Information contained within this
document is intended for personal interpretation only. No explicit instructions
or guidelines are offered within and full
appreciation of this information is the responsibility of the reader.
§ 9.03 PENAL. Confinement as Justifiable Force. Confinement is justified when force is
justified by this chapter if the actor takes reasonable measures to terminate
the confinement as soon as he knows he safely can unless the person confined
has been arrested for an offense. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff.
§ 9.04 PENAL. Threats as Justifiable Force The threat of force is justified when the
use of force is justified by this chapter. For purposes of this section, a
threat to cause death or serious bodily injury by the production of a weapon or
otherwise, as long as the actor's purpose is limited to creating an
apprehension that he will use deadly force if necessary, does not constitute
the use of deadly force. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch.
399, § 1, eff.
§ 9.05 PENAL. Reckless Injury of Innocent Third Person Even though an actor is justified under
this chapter in threatening or using force or deadly force against another, if in
doing so he also recklessly injures or kills an innocent third person, the
justification afforded by this chapter is unavailable in a prosecution for the
reckless injury or killing of the innocent third person. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff.
§ 9.06 PENAL. Civil Remedies Unaffected The fact that conduct is justified under
this chapter does not abolish or impair any remedy for the conduct that is
available in a civil suit. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch.
399, § 1, eff.
9.31 PENAL. Self-Defense (a) Except as provided in Subsection (b),
a person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree he
reasonably believes the force is immediately
necessary to protect himself against the other's
use or attempted use of unlawful force.
(b) The use of force against another is not
justified: (1) in response to verbal provocation alone; (2) to resist an
arrest or search that the actor knows is being made by a peace officer, or by a
person acting in a peace officer's presence and at his direction, even though
the arrest or search is unlawful, unless the resistance is justified under
Subsection (c); (3) if the actor consented to the exact force used or attempted
by the other; (4) if the actor provoked the other's use or attempted use of
unlawful force, unless: (A) the actor abandons the encounter, or clearly
communicates to the other his intent to do so reasonably believing he cannot
safely abandon the encounter; and (B) the other nevertheless continues or
attempts to use unlawful force against the actor; or (5) if the actor sought an
explanation from or discussion with the other person concerning the actor's
differences with the other person while the actor was: (A) carrying a weapon in
violation of Section 46.02 PENAL; or (B) possessing or transporting a weapon in
violation of Section 46.05 PENAL. (c) The use of force to resist an arrest or
search is justified: (1) if, before the actor offers any resistance, the peace
officer (or person acting at his direction) uses or attempts to use greater
force than necessary to make the arrest or search; and (2) when and to the
degree the actor reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to
protect himself against the peace officer's (or other person's) use or
attempted use of greater force than necessary. (d) The use of deadly force is
not justified under this subchapter except as provided in Sections 9.32 PENAL,9.33 PENAL, and 9.34 PENAL. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff.
§ 9.32 PENAL. Deadly Force in Defense of Person (a) A person is justified in using deadly
force against another: (1) if he would be justified in using force against the
other under Section 9.31 PENAL; (2) if a reasonable person in the actor's
situation would not have retreated; and (3) when and to the degree he
reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary: (A) to protect
himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force; or
(B) to prevent the other's imminent commission of aggravated kidnapping,
murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or aggravated
robbery. (b) The requirement imposed by Subsection (a)(2)
does not apply to an actor who uses force against a person who is at the time
of the use of force committing an offense of unlawful entry in the habitation
of the actor. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399,
§ 1, eff.
§
9.33 PENAL. Defense of Third Person A person is justified in using force or
deadly force against another to protect a third person if: (1) under the
circumstances as the actor reasonably believes them to be, the actor would be
justified under Section 9.31 PENAL or 9.32 PENAL in using force or deadly force
to protect himself against the unlawful force or unlawful deadly force he
reasonably believes to be threatening the third person he seeks to protect; and
(2) the actor reasonably believes that his intervention is immediately
necessary to protect the third person. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff.
§
9.41 PENAL. Protection of One's Own
Property (a) A person in
lawful possession of land or tangible, movable property is justified in using
force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the
force is immediately necessary to prevent or terminate the other's trespass on
the land or unlawful interference with the property. (b) A person unlawfully
dispossessed of land or tangible, movable property by another is justified in
using force against the other when and to the degree the actor reasonably
believes the force is immediately necessary to reenter the land or recover the
property if the actor uses the force immediately or in fresh pursuit after the
dispossession and: (1) the actor reasonably believes the other had no claim of
right when he dispossessed the actor; or (2) the other accomplished the
dispossession by using force, threat, or fraud against the actor. Acts 1973,
63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff.
§
9.42 PENAL. Deadly Force to Protect
Property A person is
justified in using deadly force against another to protect land or tangible,
movable property: (1) if he would be justified in using force against the other
under Section 9.41 PENAL; and (2) when and to the degree he reasonably believes
the deadly force is immediately necessary: (A) to prevent the other's imminent
commission of arson, burglary, robbery, aggravated robbery, theft during the
nighttime, or criminal mischief during the nighttime; or (B) to prevent the
other who is fleeing immediately after committing burglary, robbery, aggravated
robbery, or theft during the nighttime from escaping with the property; and (3)
he reasonably believes that: (A) the land or property cannot be protected or
recovered by any other means; or (B) the use of force other than deadly force
to protect or recover the land or property would expose the actor or another to
a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p.
883, ch. 399, § 1, eff.
§ 9.43 PENAL. Protection of Third Person's Property A person is justified in using force or
deadly force against another to protect land or tangible, movable property of a
third person if, under the circumstances as he reasonably believes them to be,
the actor would be justified under Section 9.41 PENAL or 9.42 PENAL in using
force or deadly force to protect his own land or property and: (1) the actor
reasonably believes the unlawful interference constitutes attempted or
consummated theft of or criminal mischief to the tangible, movable property; or
(2) the actor reasonably believes that: (A) the third person has requested his
protection of the land or property; (B) he has a legal duty to protect the third
person's land or property; or (C) the third person whose land or property he
uses force or deadly force to protect is the actor's spouse, parent, or child,
resides with the actor, or is under the actor's care. Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p.
883, ch. 399, § 1, eff.
§ 9.51 PENAL. Arrest and Search (a) A peace officer, or a person acting in a peace
officer's presence and at his direction, is justified in using force against
another when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the force is
immediately necessary to make or assist in making an arrest or search, or to
prevent or assist in preventing escape after arrest, if: (1) the actor
reasonably believes the arrest or search is lawful or, if the arrest or search
is made under a warrant, he reasonably believes the warrant is valid; and (2)
before using force, the actor manifests his purpose to arrest or search and
identifies himself as a peace officer or as one acting at a peace officer's
direction, unless he reasonably believes his purpose and identity are already
known by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested. (b) A
person other than a peace officer (or one acting at his direction) is justified
in using force against another when and to the degree the actor reasonably
believes the force is immediately necessary to make or assist in making a
lawful arrest, or to prevent or assist in preventing escape after lawful arrest
if, before using force, the actor manifests his purpose to and the reason for
the arrest or reasonably believes his purpose and the reason are already known
by or cannot reasonably be made known to the person to be arrested. (c) A peace
officer is justified in using deadly force against another when and to the
degree the peace officer reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately
necessary to make an arrest, or to prevent escape after arrest, if the use of
force would have been justified under Subsection (a) and: (1) the actor reasonably
believes the conduct for which arrest is authorized included the use or
attempted use of deadly force; or (2) the actor reasonably believes there is a
substantial risk that the person to be arrested will cause death or serious
bodily injury to the actor or another if the arrest is delayed. (d) A person
other than a peace officer acting in a peace officer's presence and at his
direction is justified in using deadly force against another when and to the
degree the person reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary
to make a lawful arrest, or to prevent escape after a lawful arrest, if the use
of force would have been justified under Subsection (b) and: (1) the actor
reasonably believes the felony or offense against the public peace for which
arrest is authorized included the use or attempted use of deadly force; or (2)
the actor reasonably believes there is a substantial risk that the person to be
arrested will cause death or serious bodily injury to another if the arrest is
delayed. (e) There is no duty to retreat before using deadly force justified by
Subsection (c) or (d). (f) Nothing in this section relating to the actor's
manifestation of purpose or identity shall be construed as conflicting with any
other law relating to the issuance, service, and execution of an arrest or
search warrant either under the laws of this state or the United States. (g)
Deadly force may only be used under the circumstances enumerated in Subsections
(c) and (d). Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, §
1, eff.
Citizen’s Arrest
Art. 14.01 CODE CRIM. P. [212] [259] [247] Offense within view (a) A peace officer or any other person,
may, without a warrant, arrest an offender when the offense is committed in his
presence or within his view, if the offense is one classed as a felony or as an
offense against the public peace. (b) A peace officer may arrest an offender
without a warrant for any offense committed in his presence or within his view.
Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch.
722. Amended by Acts 1967, 60th Leg., p. 1735, ch.
659, § 8, eff.
§ 9.03 PENAL. Confinement as Justifiable Force
Confinement is justified when force is justified by this chapter if the actor
takes reasonable measures to terminate the confinement as soon as he knows he
safely can unless the person confined has been arrested for an offense. Acts
1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff.
Art. 14.06 CODE CRIM. P. [217] [264] [252] Must take offender before magistrate
(a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), in each case enumerated in this Code,
the person making the arrest or the person having custody of the person
arrested shall take the person arrested or have him taken without unnecessary
delay, but not later than 48 hours after the person is arrested, before the
magistrate who may have ordered the arrest, before some magistrate of the
county where the arrest was made without an order, or, if necessary to provide
more expeditiously to the person arrested the warnings described by Article
15.17 CODE CRIM. P. of this Code, before a magistrate in a county bordering the
county in which the arrest was made. The magistrate shall immediately perform
the duties described in Article 15.17 CODE CRIM. P. of this Code. (b) A peace
officer who is charging a person, including a child, with committing an offense
that is a Class C misdemeanor, other than an offense under Section 49.02 PENAL,
Penal Code, may, instead of taking the person before a magistrate, issue a
citation to the person that contains written notice of the time and place the
person must appear before a magistrate, the name and address of the person
charged, and the offense charged. Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol.
2, p. 317, ch. 722. Amended by Acts 1967, 60th
Leg., p. 1735, ch. 659, § 10, eff.
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§ 16.003.
TWO-YEAR LIMITATIONS PERIOD.
(a) Except as provided by Sections 16.010 and 16.0045, a person must
bring suit for trespass for injury to the estate or to the property of another,
conversion of personal property, taking or detaining the personal property of
another, personal injury, forcible entry and detainer,
and forcible detainer not later than two years after
the day the cause of action accrues.
(b) A person must bring suit not later than two years after the day the
cause of action accrues in an action for injury resulting in death. The
cause of action accrues on the death of the injured person.
Acts 1985, 69th Leg., ch. 959, § 1, eff.
1997, 75th Leg., ch. 26, § 2, eff.
PENAL CODE CHAPTER 20. KIDNAPPING AND UNLAWFUL RESTRAINT
§ 20.01.
DEFINITIONS.
In this
chapter:
(1) "Restrain" means to restrict a person's movements without
consent, so as to interfere substantially with the person's liberty, by moving
the person from one place to another or by confining the person. Restraint is
"without consent" if it is accomplished by:
(A) force, intimidation, or deception;
or
(B) any means, including acquiescence of the victim,
if:
(i) the victim is a child who is less than 14
years of age or an incompetent person and the parent, guardian, or person or
institution acting in loco parentis has not
acquiesced in the movement or confinement; or
(ii) the victim is a child who is 14 years of age or older and younger
than 17 years of age, the victim is taken outside of the state and outside a
120-mile radius from the victim's residence, and the parent, guardian, or
person or institution acting in loco parentis has not
acquiesced in the movement.
(2) "Abduct" means to restrain a person with intent to prevent
his liberation by:
(A) secreting or holding him in a place where he
is not likely to be found; or
(B) using or threatening to use deadly
force.
(3) "Relative" means a parent or stepparent, ancestor, sibling,
or uncle or aunt, including an adoptive relative of the same degree through
marriage or adoption.
(4) "Person" means an individual, corporation, or
association.
(5) Notwithstanding Section 1.07, "individual" means a human
being who has been born and is alive.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff.
§ 20.02.
UNLAWFUL RESTRAINT.
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly
restrains another person.
(b) It is an affirmative
defense to prosecution under this section that:
(1) the person restrained was a child younger
than 14 years of age;
(2) the actor was a relative of the child;
and
(3) the actor's sole intent was to assume lawful control of the
child.
(c) An offense under this
section is a Class A misdemeanor, except that the offense is:
(1) a state jail felony if the person restrained was a child younger than
17 years of age; or
(2) a felony of the third degree
if:
(A) the actor recklessly exposes the victim to a substantial risk of
serious bodily injury;
(B) the actor restrains an individual the actor knows is a public servant
while the public servant is lawfully discharging an official duty or in
retaliation or on account of an exercise of official power or performance of an
official duty as a public servant; or
(C) the actor while in custody restrains any other
person.
(d) It is no offense to detain
or move another under this section when it is for the purpose of effecting a lawful arrest or detaining an individual
lawfully arrested.
(e) It is an affirmative defense
to prosecution under this section that:
(1) the person restrained was a child who is 14
years of age or older and younger than 17 years of age;
(2) the actor does not restrain the child by force, intimidation, or deception;
and
(3) the actor is not more than three years older than the
child.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff.
§ 20.03.
KIDNAPPING.
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly abducts
another person.
(b) It is an affirmative
defense to prosecution under this section that:
(1) the abduction was not coupled with intent to
use or to threaten to use deadly force;
(2) the actor was a relative of the person abducted;
and
(3) the actor's sole intent was to assume lawful control of the
victim.
(c) An offense under this
section is a felony of the third
degree.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff.
§ 20.04.
AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING.
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly abducts
another person with the intent to:
(1) hold him for ransom or
reward;
(2) use him as a shield or
hostage;
(3) facilitate the commission of a felony or the flight after the attempt
or commission of a felony;
(4) inflict bodily injury on him or violate or abuse him
sexually;
(5) terrorize him or a third person;
or
(6) interfere with the performance of any governmental or political
function.
(b) A person commits an
offense if the person intentionally or knowingly abducts another person and
uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the offense.
(c) Except as provided by
Subsection (d), an offense under this section is a felony of the first degree.
(d) At the punishment stage of
a trial, the defendant may raise the issue as to whether he voluntarily
released the victim in a safe place. If the defendant proves the issue in
the affirmative by a preponderance of the evidence, the offense is a felony of
the second degree.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff.
§ 20.05.
UNLAWFUL TRANSPORT.
(a) A person commits an offense if the person for pecuniary benefit
transports an individual in a manner that:
(1) is designed to conceal the individual from local, state, or federal
law enforcement authorities; and
(2) creates a substantial likelihood that the individual will suffer
serious bodily injury or death.
(b) An offense under this
section is a state jail
felony.
Added by Acts
1999, 76th Leg., ch. 1014, § 1, eff.
§ 22.01.
ASSAULT.
(a) A person commits an offense if the
person:
(1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to
another, including the person's spouse;
(2) intentionally or knowingly threatens another with imminent bodily
injury, including the person's spouse; or
(3) intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another when
the person knows or should reasonably believe that the other will regard the
contact as offensive or provocative.
(b) An offense under
Subsection (a)(1) is a Class A misdemeanor, except that the offense is a felony
of the third degree if the offense is committed against:
(1) a person the actor knows is a public servant while the public servant
is lawfully discharging an official duty, or in retaliation or on account of an
exercise of official power or performance of an official duty as a public
servant;
(2) a member of the defendant's family or household, if it is shown on
the trial of the offense that the defendant has been previously convicted of an
offense against a member of the defendant's family or household under this
section; or Text of subsec. (b)(3) as added by
Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 294, § 1 (3) a person
who contracts with government to perform a service in a facility as defined by
Section 1.07(a)(14), Penal Code; Section 51.02(13), Family Code; or
Section 51.02(14), Family Code, or an employee of that person:
(A) while the person or employee is engaged in performing a service
within the scope of the contract, if the actor knows the person or employee is
authorized by government to provide the service; or
(B) in retaliation for or on account of the person's or employee's
performance of a service within the scope of the contract. Text
of subsec. (b)(3) as
added by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 1019, § 1
(3) a person the actor knows is a security officer while the officer is
performing a duty as a security officer.
(c) An offense under
Subsection (a)(2) or (3) is a Class C misdemeanor, except that the offense is:
(1) a Class A misdemeanor if the offense is committed under Subsection
(a)(3) against an elderly individual or disabled individual, as those terms are
defined by Section 22.04; or
(2) a Class B misdemeanor if the offense is committed by a person who is
not a sports participant against a person the actor knows is a sports
participant either:
(A) while the participant is performing duties or responsibilities in the
participant's capacity as a sports participant; or
(B) in retaliation for or on account of the participant's performance of
a duty or responsibility within the participant's capacity as a sports
participant.
(d) For purposes of Subsection
(b), the actor is presumed to have known the person assaulted was a public
servant or a security officer if the person was wearing a distinctive uniform
or badge indicating the person's employment as a public servant or status as a
security officer.
(e) In this
section:
(1) "Family" has the meaning assigned
by Section 71.003, Family Code.
(2) "Household" has the meaning assigned by Section 71. 005, Family Code. Text of subsec. (e)(3) as added by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 1019, § 2 (3) "Security officer" means
a commissioned security officer as defined by Section 1702.002, Occupations
Code, or a noncommissioned security officer registered under Section 1702.221,
Occupations Code. Text of subsec.
(e)(3) as added by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 1028, §
1 (3) "Sports participant" means a person who participates in
any official capacity with respect to an interscholastic, intercollegiate, or
other organized amateur or professional athletic competition and includes an
athlete, referee, umpire, linesman, coach, instructor, administrator, or staff
member.
(f) For the purposes of this
section, a defendant has been previously convicted of an offense against a
member of the defendant's family or a member of the defendant's household under
this section if the defendant was adjudged guilty of the offense or entered a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere
in return for a grant of deferred adjudication, regardless of whether the sentence
for the offense was ever imposed or whether the sentence was probated and the
defendant was subsequently discharged from community supervision.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff.
§ 22.02.
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT.
(a) A person commits an offense if the person commits assault as defined
in § 22.01 and the person:
(1) causes serious bodily injury to another,
including the person's spouse; or
(2) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the
assault.
(b) An offense under this
section is a felony of the second degree, except that the offense is a felony
of the first degree if the offense is committed:
(1) by a public servant acting under color of the servant's office or
employment;
(2) against a person the actor knows is a public servant while the public
servant is lawfully discharging an official duty, or in retaliation or on
account of an exercise of official power or performance of an official duty as
a public servant;
(3) in retaliation against or on account of the service of another as a
witness, prospective witness, informant, or person who has reported the
occurrence of a crime; or
(4) against a person the actor knows is a security officer while the
officer is performing a duty as a security officer.
(c) The actor is presumed to
have known the person assaulted was a public servant or a security officer if
the person was wearing a distinctive uniform or badge indicating the person's
employment as a public servant or status as a security officer.
(d) In this section,
"security officer" means a commissioned security officer as defined
by Section 1702.002, Occupations Code, or a noncommissioned security officer
registered under Section 1702.221, Occupations Code.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff.
§ 22.05.
DEADLY CONDUCT.
(a) A person commits an offense if he recklessly engages in conduct that
places another in imminent danger of serious bodily injury.
(b) A person commits an
offense if he knowingly discharges a firearm at or in the direction of:
(1) one or more individuals;
or
(2) a habitation, building, or vehicle and is reckless as to whether the
habitation, building, or vehicle is occupied.
(c) Recklessness and danger
are presumed if the actor knowingly pointed a firearm at or in the direction of
another whether or not the actor believed the firearm to be loaded.
(d) For purposes of this
section, "building," "habitation," and "vehicle"
have the meanings assigned those terms by Section 30.01.
(e) An offense under
Subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor. An offense under Subsection (b)
is a felony of the third degree.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff.
§ 22.06.
CONSENT AS DEFENSE TO ASSAULTIVE CONDUCT. The victim's
effective consent or the actor's reasonable belief that the victim consented to
the actor's conduct is a defense to prosecution under Section 22.01 (Assault),
22.02 (Aggravated Assault), or 22.05 (Deadly Conduct) if:
(1) the conduct did not threaten or inflict serious bodily injury;
or
(2) the victim knew the conduct was a risk
of:
(A) his
occupation;
(B) recognized medical treatment;
or
(C) a scientific experiment conducted by recognized
methods.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff.
§ 22.07.
TERRORISTIC THREAT.
(a) A person commits an offense if he threatens to commit any offense
involving violence to any person or property with intent to:
(1) cause a reaction of any type to his threat by an official or
volunteer agency organized to deal with emergencies;
(2) place any person in fear of imminent serious bodily
injury;
(3) prevent or interrupt the occupation or use of a building;
room; place of assembly; place to which the public has
access; place of employment or occupation; aircraft, automobile, or
other form of conveyance; or other public place;
(4) cause impairment or interruption of public communications, public
transportation, public water, gas, or power supply or other public service;
(5) place the public or a substantial group of the public in fear of
serious bodily injury; or
(6) influence the conduct or activities of a branch or agency of the
federal government, the state, or a political subdivision of the state. Text of subsec. (b) as
amended by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 139, § 1 and
Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 388, § 2 (b) An
offense under Subdivision (1) or (2) of Subsection (a) is a Class B
misdemeanor, except that an offense under Subdivision (2) of Subsection (a) is
a Class A misdemeanor if the offense is committed against a member of the
person's family or household or otherwise constitutes family violence or if the
offense is committed against a public servant. An offense under
Subdivision (3) of Subsection (a) is a Class A misdemeanor. An offense
under Subdivision (4), (5), or (6) of Subsection (a) is a felony of the third
degree. Text of subsec. (b) as amended by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch.
388, § 2 and Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 446, § 1
(b) An offense under Subdivision (1) or (2) of Subsection (a) is a Class
B misdemeanor. An offense under Subdivision (3) of Subsection (a) is a
Class A misdemeanor, unless the actor causes pecuniary loss of $1,500 or more
to the owner of the building, room, place, or conveyance, in which event the
offense is a state jail felony. An offense under Subdivision (4), (5), or
(6) of Subsection (a) is a felony of the third degree. Text
of subsec. (c) as added
by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 139, § 1 (c) In
this
section:
(1) "Family" has the meaning assigned by Section 71.003, Family
Code.
(2) "Family violence" has the meaning assigned by Section
71.004, Family Code.
(3) "Household" has the meaning assigned by Section 71.005,
Family Code. Text of subsec.
(c) as added by Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 446, § 1
(c) The amount of pecuniary loss under Subsection (b) is the amount of
economic loss suffered by the owner of the building, room, place, or conveyance
as a result of the prevention or interruption of the occupation or use of the
building, room, place, or conveyance.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, § 1, eff.
Further Resources:
For full statutes
(all the laws of the State of
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/statutes/statutes.html
A discussion about
use of force & citizen's arrest:
http://www.packing.org/news/article.jsp/4195
An overview for security, includes a section on citizen's arrest and
liability:
http://www.tcps.state.tx.us/testing/leveltwo_review.aspx
A reasonably good discussion of the (US) legal ramifications of self
defense:
http://www.nononsenseselfdefense.com/legal.html
This collection of
informational resources was compiled by the members of the Thursday night class, Frank Swehosky, Zack Lara,
Devon Smith, and Katie Parsoneault,
as a special assignment from Robertson Sensei. We would like to see
resources like these become more readily available to all who train with Still Point, and we would like to invite you
to add any useful resources you might know of or discover.
Please let
the Thursday night class members know your opinion of this project. Send us email individually, or address us through the Still Point
discussion list, stillpoint@stillpointaikido.com.
The discussion list is used these days mostly for announcements, but it is
available for discussions of any dojo-related or
aikido-related topics of interest.
Thank you for
reading!
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